Cambodian Incursions
Toan Thang "Total Victory" Operations
and U.S. POWs
Part III
Updates, Documents & Summation
Please read Parts I & II First
© 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 The Northwest Veterans Newsletter
No Duplication or Distribution allowed without expressed permission!
Contact: Roger Young
Toan Thang "Total Victory" Operations
and U.S. POWs
Part III
Updates, Documents & Summation
Please read Parts I & II First
© 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 The Northwest Veterans Newsletter
No Duplication or Distribution allowed without expressed permission!
Contact: Roger Young
Playing "Our Nation's Heroes" - J. Cutright
Document URL: http://northwestvets.com/spurs/cambod-2.htm
Disclaimer:
Please be aware that the opinions stated in this report are my own unless otherwise indicated. My personal opinions do not necessarily reflect the opinions of fellow Silver Spurs or the 3/17th Air Cavalry Reunion committee. I invite other Silver Spurs, POW activists, researchers and other interested parties for their comments and views. With their EXPRESSED permission I would be most happy to post their replies.
My sincere and heartfelt thanks to my fellow 3/17th troopers for all their research on this subject. Much of what appears here is because of his personal research and to the authors of the books indicated throughout this report and in my appendix.
Roger Young Part III:
In Parts I and II, I discussed the lesser known POW aspects of the incursions into Cambodia. Not just the better-known '70 Incursion which created a great outcry here in the states, but also a later cross-border op in which my troop again found itself providing air support for ARVN in 1971 after I had returned to The World.
About the same time as the '71 ARVN push into Cambodia, the infamous cross-border incursion into Laos was also underway. Lam Son 719 commenced on Feb 8th and ended on April 9th, 1971. This cross-border incursion into Laos often declared a victory for Nixon's policy of "Vietnamization," [turning the war over to ARVN] was - in fact - a dismal military failure. Press reports after the operation indicated ARVN casualties near 50%!
Let's explore further... Enter POW Douglas Ramsey...
Bayon Temple, Angkor Thum
The giant faces carved on the Bayon temple at the Angkor Thum complex in northwestern
Cambodia represent both the Buddha and King Jayavarman VII (ruled about 1130-1219).
Although a Buddhist temple, Angkor Thum was modeled after the great Hindu temple complex of Angkor Wat
Encarta Encyclopedia Simeone Huber/Tony Stone Images
Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia 2002. © 1993-2001 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Regards,
The Northwest Veterans Newsletter
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Ramsey's bio speaks volumes by itself. But while researching Ramsey, I found another man of interest.
Enter.... John Paul Vann....
U.S. CIVILIAN GETS TOP POST. The U.S. command announced May 15 [1971] the appointment of John Paul Vann, 46, as director of the Second Regional Assistance Group in Military Region II in central South Vietnam. He was the first civilian to have overall supervision of American military and civilian activities in one of the country's four military regions. Operational control of the 67,000 American troops in Military Region II would remain under the U.S. Military Assistance Command. For the past five years Vann had headed the U.S. pacification program in the Mekong Delta.
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Neil Sheehan, mentioned in the CIA Reports Red Spy Ring, is the author of, A Bright Shining Lie - John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam and After the War Was Over - Hanoi and Saigon.
Sheehan reports Vann was killed the evening of June 9, 1972 approximately three miles south of the Chu Pao (PAO Mountain) Pass below Kontum near Montagnard hamlet of Ro Uay. Vann was buried in Arlington on June 16, 1972.
In Sheehan's book, he reports: "They [ARVN] heard a helicopter approaching through the dark sky and then saw the fireball and heard the explosion of a crash. The Army aviators found him."
Of interest Sheehan reported that witnesses did not report any shots being fired despite North Vietnam's public claims of shooting Vann's chopper down. Later investigation showed the Jet-Ranger had crashed at cruising power into the trees. Speculation is that the crash was a result of vertigo.
Being a civilian, Vann is not listed on the Wall.
Now we see John Paul Vann, who was appointed at age 46, director of the Second Regional Assistance Group in Military Region II in central South Vietnam. Certainly not a low-level post. And Vann is certainly a man of interest.
My wife, Pam, who is a Vietnam-era veteran who worked for four years at CINCPAC, Joint Staff, and who worked on files for Operation Homecoming, recognized Vann's name. Vann's name also appears in a book by Neil Sheehan. Sheehan's name also appears in CIA Reports Red Spy Ring.
Sheehan authored the Pulitzer Prize winning, A Bright Shining Lie - John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam and later, After the War Was Over - Hanoi and Saigon.
Sheehan reports Vann had a friend who was captured and held in and near the Cambodian border. The POWs felt they were northwest of Tay Ninh (Fish Hook). Vann's friend's name was a POW Douglas Ramsey, a civilian State Department employee. Ramsey was later released, along with 26 others in February of 1973, from Cambodia. In the excerpt below please bear in mind that Vann was a supporter of President Nixon's decision to attack the sanctuaries inside Cambodia in 1970. But earlier he was not.
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In Parts I & II we presented evidence that indicates that our intelligence agencies and the American government knew U.S. POWs were being held in Cambodia. However, there was a doubt in my mind if our policy makers were aware of POW camps PRIOR to the '70 Incursion. I think we can put that doubt to rest at this time. What I know now is that U.S. Intelligence Agencies must certainly have been aware of at least one particular POW camp PRIOR to the 1970 Cambodian Incursion.
In fact, an article recently surfaced which was published in the Hawk magazine, the official 1st Aviation Brigades in-country publication, that details the rescue of an escaped POW near Tay Ninh in April of 1969 which removes further doubt if such camps in Cambodia were known to exist! And C Troop of my own squadron, was responsible for his rescue!
See C - 3/17th Rescues POW - Apr '69
The Ramsey information clearly shows 27 Americans were released from a separate camp from the Hanoi prison system. The Hanoi prison system is where the vast majority of those released during Operation Homecoming were held. This would clearly indicate that there was, at that time, a second-tier prisoner of war system. Many who condemn POW activists claim there was not a second-tier prison system and that those held in Hanoi knew ALL the names of U.S. POWs being held by the enemy. Yet the POW community knew nothing of the D Troop 3/17th raid until just recently nor who was held in that camp.
It has also been shown that the missions may well have been compromised by security leaks. Perhaps the following excerpt of Gen. Secord's testimony before the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA's in 1992 provides some further insight
By Mr.Kravitz (Resuming):
A. I don't think so. Page 97 Q. [to Secord] What exactly was Mr.Sullivan's position in 1972 and 1973, when you were the Laos Desk Officer? A. He was DAS for East Asia, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, East Asia. Q. Okay. I think these Inter-agency meetings -- and he was the Chairman of this group? A. Of the Ad Hoc Group on Indochina. Q. Were POW issues discussed in meetings of that group?
A. Oh, I'm sure they were. But I don't have specific recall. The
relationship with State were not all that good.
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. I mean most of us saw them as a part of the problem rather than part of
the solution. These onerous rules of engagement, for instance, were, at least
in part, because of State Department concerns. The main reason why you had
all this inordinate number of POW's and MIA's is because of the rules of
engagement. If you want to conclude your investigation right now, you can do
that with one line: Rules of engagement were whacko; therefore, we lost a lot
of people we shouldn't have. So, you know, military people weren't all that Page 98
I already mentioned the Geneva Accords. I might also point out they were not coordinated with or even informed on the Christmas bombing campaign, not even informed, because we couldn't trust them not to leak. Does that give you a flavor for the environment of the time? Q. It does. I think that same type of environment existed all the way up to the very top. I know that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs really noted a similar military-civilian disagreement on pretty much everything when we spoke with him a couple of weeks ago. A. Which one, Moorer? Q. Yes. [End of testimony excerpt] Webmaster's Footnote:(2) For more on Mr.Sullivan, see the The USAF CHECO Report, and the bio on Evelyn Anderson & Beatrice Kosin.
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We have also uncovered some information which may be of additional value in this dicussion. This concerns the case of Dr. Eleanor Ardel Vietti, a civilian doctor who worked at a leprosarium hospital near Ban Me Thuot and who was captured by the VC on 30 May 1962 and was never returned.
Below is an excerpt from the 24 May '72 edition of The Alliance Witness:
- "Last September, [1971] Rev. Donald L. Bubna talked with Mrs. Mitchell at Ban Me Thuot concerning the
whereabouts of her husband and the other two captives. Mrs. Mitchell referred to the military push into
Cambodia in 1970. "There was a report that some tribespeople had talked with an American lady
and a man near the border as they were coming into Viet Nam," she said. "They reported that
they were those who were taken about eight years before that. The Americans immediately went
out and found the hospital complex where it was reported to be located, but it had already been
evacuated. Even though our people weren't there, we feel definitely that these were our people."
Mrs. Mitchell continued, "Then too, we had heard through another contact that they were really
very valuable to the Viet Cong right at this time. There was such a big military push that they
were needed in the hospital work so the Viet Cong couldn't give them up yet, but they were
going to take good care of them."
The fate of Dr. Vietti still remains unknown...
And as additional evidence we offer you to following declassified documents, which dispels any myth that the U.S. government was not aware of American POWs being held inside of Cambodia prior to the '70 incursion:
Declassified Docs The following documents have been declassified and recently released by the CIA on 10 Dec '98 thanks to VFW Post 2713's POW Chair, Pete Peters. The following three pages dated 4 Feb 1967 once and for all put to rest if the U.S. Government was aware of possible American POWs in the Mimot area of Cambodia PRIOR to the 1970 Cambodia Incursion. I thank Pete Peters and VFW Post 2713 for getting this document through the FOIA.
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Now, let's pin down more on the "elusive" location of COSVN.... and it's personal connection to POWs....
Mimot Secret Revealed! Earlier we make much mention of Mimot. A copy of two maps were sent to me by Dave Murray, a very well respected Vietnam veteran who serves as New Jersey's POW/MIA Chair for Vietnam Veterans of America. Dave has been keeping up with our report on operations in Cambodia and the possible connection to our captured and unrepatriated fellow soldiers. Recently he came across a book written by one of our former enemies which sheds additional light on the significance of the Mimot area in Cambodia. Below is a copy of that map and a short excerpt from the book entitled: "A Viet Cong Memoir" by former PRG Minister of Justice, Truong Nhu Tang, Vintage Books, Copyright 1985 (Random House). The excerpt also clarifies if our intel was aware of the location of COSVN prior to the 1970 & '71 Cambodia incursions. It is also interesting to note that earlier we had found that just prior to the 1970 and 1971 incursions this area was NOT bombed prior to those specific incursions which would be usual practice. Yet from the excerpt below we learn that the Mimot area was often the target of "secret" B-52 bombings previously. It would appear the only ones to not know of these bombings would be the American people and soldiers in Vietnam who would perish in that area. Our sincere thanks to our fellow veteran for sending us this important information.
Excerpt:
[page] 168 A VIET CONG MEMOIR:
"It was something of a miracle that from 1968 through 1970 the attacks, though they caused significant casualties generally, did not kill a single one of the military or civilian leaders in the headquarters complexes. This luck, though, had a lot to do with accurate advance warning of the raids, which allowed us to move out of the way or take refuge in our bunkers before the bombs began to rain down. · B-52s flying out of Okinawa and Guam would be picked up by
Soviet intelligence trawlers plying the South China Sea. The planes' headings and air speed would be computed and relayed to COSVN headquarters, which would then order NLF or Northern elements in the anticipated target zones to move away perpendicularly to the attack trajectory. Flights originating from the Thai bases were monitored both on radar and visually by our intelligence nets there and the information similarly relayed.
"Often the warnings would give us time to grab some rice and escape by foot or bike down one of the emergency routes. Hours later we would return to find, as happened on several occasions, that there was nothing left. It was as if an enormous scythe had swept through the jungle, felling the giant teak and go trees like grass in its way, shredding them into billions of scattered splinters. On these occasions--when the B-52s had found their mark--the complex
would be utterly destroyed: food, clothes, supplies, documents, everything. It was not just that things were destroyed; in some awesome way they had ceased to exist. You would come back to where your lean-to and bunker had been, your home, and there would simply be nothing there, just an unrecognizable landscape gouged by immense
craters." When did COSVN Move? Excerpt:
[page] 177 A VIET CONG MEMOIR:
"Then on March 18, 1970, while Sihanouk was vacationing in France, his opponents struck, deposing him as head of the Cambodian government. Sihanouk's removal was for us a cause of instant anxiety, as we now looked over our shoulders at Cambodia, not as a refuge but as a potential danger. With Sihanouk's less-than-farsighted minister Lon Nol in power, Phnom Penh immediately began to stare in our direction with undisguised hostility. Sensing the possibility of entrapment between a Saigon/American offensive from the east and Royal Cambodian Army pressure from the west, COSVN did not wait to monitor developments in the Cambodian capital. On March 19 the permanent staff moved out toward positions that had been readied deep inside Kratie. By the time troops from the American 25th Division struck the headquarters area during the American/Cambodian incursion, the COSVN command staff had been gone almost two months." Escape Route of PRG Forces
On April 2nd, 1970 following the pullout of COSVN leadership in March, PRG leadership began their long trek towards Kratie along Route 7 which was under heavy attack by ARVN forces. (U.S. forces would not cross until a month later). A corridor was opened by the PLAF's 9th Division blocking the ARVN thrust from the East, while the PLAF's 5th Division blocked Cambodian forces from the West. The 5th Division would also be involved in the later 1971 Cambodian incursion near the Chup Rubber plantation where ARVN forces would be devastated. You will see in this report MACV in-country planning for the American/Cambodia incursion purportedly did not take place until late April, 1970! Early 1971 CIA Report Indicates Move and American POWs Sighted! We have also received a declassified CIA Intelligence Information Report dtd 12Feb71 of a live-sighting report of American POWs in the Mimot area being moved to Kratie during the 1970 U.S. incursion. This CIA report also supports Truong Nhu Tang's claims (above) that enemy forces were moving to Kratie as a result of the 1970 U.S. cross-border operation into Cambodia and much more! Subject: "POW camps for allied prisoners in Cambodia subordinate to the General Office for South Vietnam -- Problems created for the camps and hospitals in the area of allied military action." CIA Intelligence Information Report
OPERATION MENU From: Dictionary of the Vietnam War -- Edited by James S. Olson On March 18, 1969, the U.S. Air Force began Operation Menu, a series of secret, illegal B-52 bombings of National Liberation Front (NLF; see Vietcong) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) sanctuaries in eastern Cambodia (see Kampuchea). It continued for fifteen months until the Cambodian invasion (May 1970), when it was renamed Operation Freedom Deal and expanded to include "targets" throughout Cambodia. Freedom Deal continued until Congress prohibited funds for bombing Cambodia effective August 15, 1973. By their end 16,527 sorties had been flown and 383,851 tons of bombs dropped. General Creighton Abrams had wanted to attack sanctuaries for some time; however, President Lyndon Johnson repeatedly refused permission. When Richard Nixon became president in January 1969, these requests were resubmitted with the justifications that striking sanctuaries would reduce NLF-NVA offensive capabilities and the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) (the NLF-NVA command structure) had been located [webmaster's emphasis] and could be destroyed by either ground or air attack. After initial hesitation, Nixon approved, for reasons of his own. The bombing was to "signal" Hanoi that Nixon was "tougher" than Johnson and to lend credence to the "mad man" image he wanted to create among North Vietnamese leaders. "Menu" was a series of attacks (meals) against NLF-NVA Base Areas: "Breakfast" -- Base Area 353, 25 square kilometers near the Fishhook, inhabited by 1,640 Cambodians (U.S. military population estimates) and the supposed headquarters of COSVN; "Lunch" -- Base Area 609, located on the Laotian-Cambodian-Vietnamese borders and inhabited by 198 Cambodians; "Snack" -- Base Area 351, 101 square kilometers in the Fishhook including one town and 383 Cambodians; ''Dinner'' -- Base Area 352, located in the Fishhook including one town and 770 Cambodians; and "Dessert" -- Base Area 350, located north of the Fishhook with 120 Cambodians. The military did not recommend bombing Base Areas 354, 704, and 707 because they had substantial Cambodian populations. Nonetheless, Base Area 704 was authorized as "Supper" with 247 B52 missions flown against it. In March 1970 Nixon authorized expanded bombing of Laos, including B-52 raids against the Plain of Jars.  [Map courtesy of "Incursion"] Officially, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam claimed the Base Areas were not inhabited by Cambodian civilians, but private military reports indicated awareness of civilian presence and expectations of civilian casualties. These reports contended that although casualties should be light because the Base Areas were sparsely populated and Cambodians lived apart from the NLF-NVA, "some Cambodian casualties would be sustained... [and] the surprise effect of attacks would tend to increase casualties... [due to] probable lack of protective shelter around Cambodian homes." The number of Cambodians killed is unknown. Nixon, very concerned that Operation Menu not become public knowledge, ordered elaborate security measures which included falsification of military records, an offense punishable by court-martial under Article 107 of The Uniform Code of Military Justice, so there was absolutely no record of the bombings having occurred. Nixon and Henry Kissinger's justification was that secrecy was necessary to protect Cambodia's Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who gave his "tacit consent." They do not provide evidence to support this proposition, and Prince Sihanouk vehemently denies he consented, tacitly or otherwise. Sources: William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia, 1979; John Morrocco, The Vietnam Experience. Rain of Fire: Air War, 1969-1973, 1984.
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Below is more disturbing information on COSVN and POWs:
The "Cuban Program" and COSVN
House Testimony of former POW Mike Benge
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Recent Significant Updates: Cubans Known to Interrogate U.S. POWs in 1965 First To Escape "After being debriefed [in 1965], Isaac Camacho was promoted to master sergeant, and he later received a field promotion to captain. [U.S.] AUTHORITIES TOLD HIM NOT TO SPEAK ABOUT HIS ENCOUNTER WITH THE CUBANS."
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Now we turn to an interesting discussion on compromised missions....
DURING THE VIETNAM WAR? |
Recent News on Cambodia Search for POW Remains at Kratie Cambodia Date: 01/30/2000 The following is in from Jay Veith, which if true, only helps confirm our report that American POWs were held in Kratie as a result of the Cambodia incursion of 1970. To date we haven't seen any evidence of American or ARVN ground ops that far north and west into Cambodia. The question is: Is this evidence that U.S. bombing missions during the early '70's DID kill U.S. POWs inside Cambodia? Or possibly remains from B-52 lost in that area. If the latter, which ones? As you know from this report, Maj. Mark Smith was one who was moved from the Fish Hook region during the '70 incursion to Kratie following the earlier movement of the COSVN hierarchy from Mimot, and NLF/PRG leadership from the Parrot's Beak area west of Tay Ninh to Kratie. One must also seriously consider the following point: Kratie, and many other areas throughout a vast area of Cambodia are sites of the "killing fields" by the murderous Khmer Rouge. If there are remains of U.S. personnel, were they killed by U.S. carpet bombings as the article below might suggest? Or were they killed by the Khmer Rouge or other former enemies and co-mingled with those from the killing fields? To date the no U.S. administration has pressed for a war crimes tribunal for former Khmer Rouge high-level officals. Why is that?
Perhaps Neil Sheehan's later book, After the War Was Over printed in 1992 sheds some light on why such war crimes trials have not been pushed for by the U.S. government. He states: "The fighting, however, did not stop. At the urging of Washington and Beijing, Thailand protected Pol Pot and his followers in border sanctuaries while China and the United States connived at rebuilding the Khmer Rouge into a potent guerrilla force. [Webmaster's emphasis]. By the time Vietnam withdrew the last of its army almost ten years later at the end of September 1989, leaving behind military advisors and a small backup force to sustain the Phnom Penh regime, the Vietnamese had lost another 25,000 soldiers dead and 55,000 seriously wounded. In all, nearly as many Vietnamese soldiers died in the border clashes and subsequently in Cambodia itself as Americans did in the whole of the Vietnam War. The Vietnamese wondered rhetorically what the United States would have done if a government like Pol Pot's had come to power in Canada and launched assaults on Detroit and other cities along the American-Canadian border." ----------------------------------- Agence France-Presse US MIA mission yields new bone finds in Cambodia PHNOM PENH, Jan 28 (AFP) - A United States military team probing crash and burial sites in northern Cambodia has uncovered the possible remains of US soldiers killed in the early 1970's, an embassy spokesman said Friday. The 40-member team -- led by US deputy assistant secretary of defence for POW/MIA affairs Robert Jones -- discovered the remains while on a visit to the northern province of Kratie, the scene of heavy US carpet bombing in the 1970's. The fragments are set to be sent for DNA testing in Hawaii, the official said, adding the team was set to continue the search for missing servicemen along Cambodia's southern coastline. A total of 74 US personnel are listed as missing in Cambodia, and 21 MIA missions have so far yielded just seven positive identifications. [End]
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Summation: If you have read this far you are probably one of the few. In fact you most likely were involved in the Cambodia incursions looking for answers as I and a few other fellow Silver Spurs were when we started this research. Along the way we got some help from others, both military and those involved in our intelligence agencies, and gleaned insight from our former enemies. We are grateful for their direction and contributions to history and the truth. We learned that our former enemy feared U.S. involvement of ground and air support in the Vietnam war. They admit that they never intended to win a head-on military victory against the military might of the U.S. They have also admitted that their losses during the ‘68 Tet, the siege at Khe Sanh, the U.S. cross-border incursions into Cambodia and their later Easter Offensive cost them dearly in lives and material and were no military victory -- despite what the U.S. press reported or still is falsely reporting and passing off as “history” to the American people. To this day the press and history books report that the domino theory was a bunch of hog wash. Yet Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos are communist countries where millions have perished. Burma is questionable and the political balance in the Philippines is still very much in doubt over the long haul and North Korea and China are rattling their nuclear sabers. It is far too soon to declare that the domino “theory” could not become domino “fact.” Americans tend to think short-term. Other countries and ideologies have long-term goals. The leadership of the NLF/PRG and many of the leaders who made up COSVN realized that to win their “war of liberation” they had to win support for a complete U.S. withdrawal demanded by the American home front, and that their focus with the aid of their allies such as the Soviet Union, was in that arena, not on conventional battlefields. There aim was to isolate the South Vietnamese government. All the major battles mentioned in the paragraph above were considered military losses by our former enemy, but with the exception of the Easter Offensive the U.S. press declared the ‘68 Tet a military victory for our enemy, predicted the protracted siege on Khe Sanh would be America’s Dien Bien Phu (the final battle where French forces were defeated in 1954 by the Vietminh) and that the U.S. cross-border incursion into Cambodia in 1970 and the “secret bombings” were an escalation and expansion of the war and a dismal failure to find COSVN. The fact is that the ‘68 Tet including the occupation of Hue, was a dismal military failure to our former enemies. The fact is that Khe Sanh did not fall. The fact is that the NVA, NLF, PRG, elements of the Soviet Union and Cuba were already occupying vast regions of eastern and northern Cambodia PRIOR to the “secret” bombings or Nixon’s decision to send U.S. troops into Cambodia. The world had long known the war had expanded into Cambodia and Laos while that information was intentionally kept from the American public. We suspected and found that repeatedly throughout the war, that major and highly-classified U.S. and ARVN military operations were repeatedly compromised. B-52 bombing targets and SOG insertion points were known. The objectives of major U.S. and ARVN ground missions were far too often known by our enemy well in advance which allowed the enemy to move American POWs, to simply vanish into the jungles, cities or villages, or to spring deadly ambushes. Our former enemy had agents in the villages, Vietnamese help on our bases, high-level informants in the Saigon government and their Soviet allies may have possibly been monitoring (as some have suggested) our UHF transmissions (thought to be secure) for B-52 targets. However, some missions HAD to be compromised at very high levels of our own military and political channels or in what was thought to be very secure military message traffic. Such high-level leaks with repeated failures HAD to be known with time by our military commanders, high-level politicians and U.S. intelligence agencies. Such high-level leaks could and should have been used to our military advantage as in previous wars but we have found little, if any, evidence of that being the case. Instead, the conflict rolled along with mounting losses, unsuccessful U.S. POW rescue missions, expansion of the Phoenix Program, and enabled our former enemy to win their most important objective... In the end both the military and civilian leadership of this country must share the blame for the disastrous outcome of the Vietnam war, the fall of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to the communists which resulted in the loss of millions, and for the lives that were lost during the war and are still being lost due to PTSD, Agent Orange, Hepatitis-C and depression, not to mention the POW issue that is still not resolved. And certainly those agents of the mainstream press, Jane Fonda, Congress and others must recognize the role they played in aiding our former enemy to win the battle here on America’s home front and for continuing to deceive the American public with revisionist history to obscure the ugly clandestine truth -- while denying the veterans who fought honorably from the DMZ to the Delta, from the jungles and hills of Cambodia and Laos the dignity and peace they truly deserve for the sacrifices they have made... An excellent read is: SOG / The Untold True Story of 'Mad Dog' Shriver courtesy of the "UltimateSniper.com" which features a article from: Maj. Plaster’s book, "SOG: The Secret Wars of America’s Commandos in Vietnam," published by Simon & Schuster which took place in April 1969. An excerpt from the "Ultimate Sniper" site reads: Of interest in the Maj. Plaster's book is references to Gen. Davison mentioned in our research who again played a significant role in the 1970 Cambodia incursion, and H. Kissinger who certainly played a major role in the Laos and Cambodia missions, the "peace with honor" peace talks, and the POW/MIA issue that continues to date. In fact in the February 2001 edition of Harper's magazine, Christopher Hitchens' article; "The Case Against Henry Kissinger - The Making of a War Criminal" indicates that Kissinger micro-managed the Cambodia operation personally. (3) Another very excellent read by former POW Frank Anton uncovers a great deal of information. On the back cover of his book, "Why Didn't You Get Me Out?" we read: And from the section; "Amazing Capabilities" And most chilling, Anton later writes;
Anton's book is a must read! It is available from St. Martin's paperbacks, ISBN: 0-312-97488-4 © 1997. For much more on Frank Anton, please see OJC's site at: http://www.ojc.org/anton/
In our search for the truth we have attempted to answer the question; Did the U.S. government knowingly kill American POWS in '70? We have been unable to find evidence to support such, but I personally believe there was a possibility some were killed and may not have fared as well as the group Douglas Ramsey was in during the joint offensive into Cambodia. During the advance of American forces in the Fish Hook it could be possible some of our men became victims of "friendly fire" from bombs or artillery. Or you can view all of this from a different angle and conclude that Ramsey's group was very fortunate to have evaded death. Was it intentional? That remains to be documented, but I know U.S. forces who were flying the airstikes, those advancing on the ground or flying gunship and aero-scout support certainly would NOT have knowingly killed U.S. personnel. Perhaps documents in the future will provide us more specific information to pass such judgment, but as of this writing, the jury is still out on this subject. My heartfelt personal thanks to Mike Benge, Doug Huffman, Ed Johnson, Dave Murray, DStormMom, Pete Peters, Bill Nevius, "Vietnam" magazine, Gary Lorentzen and others for helping two Silver Spurs - Dan Sutherland and I - in this research, and also a sincere "thank you" to those authors and publishers of the books used in our research. And finally to Steve Golding for his personal support throughout this project. Without their personal contributions, assistance and courage I would know little more today than I did thirty years ago. I hope we have collectively touched on some of the truth, so that fellow Vietnam veterans and family members can find some of that peace we have all been looking for. Hopefully, someday, POW activists will find this research of interest in their quest for answers. The 1970 Cambodia incursion and the 1972 "Christmas Bombings" were two operations during the war that made military sense and were ordered by President Nixon. However, both operations were again hampered and limited by those who put politics before sound military operations. It is also important to point out that the Joint Chiefs throughout the war played a significant role in the final tragic outcome which is well detailed in H.R. McMaster's 1997 book, "Dereliction of Duty". Not to mention McNamara, his "Whiz Kids" and Johnson's "Wise Men" as outlined in Wayne Thompson's "To Hanoi and Back". Between those two books alone you will learn of the ridiculous constraints put on our military forces in Southeast Asia. In my opinion I don't see how most of the top civilian leadership during the war found their way to the can without help, let alone conduct a war or bring us "peace with honor" ! But the seeds were sown early in the war, long before the 1970 Incursion, and the military importance of that sanctuary - and Laos - well known during the first major battle of U.S. airmobile forces against the NVA in a place called the Ia Drang Valley. Then LTC (now Lt. Gen. Ret.) 'Hal' Moore who led the 1/7th into LZ X-Ray writes in his book, We Were Soldiers Once... And Young some important observations regarding Cambodia: "General Kinnard says that this was the point at which, under political direction, the American military surrendered the initiative to North Vietnam. What it said to Harry Kinnard was that this war would never end in an American victory. Initiative had been sacrificed to the polite diplomatic fiction that Cambodia was sovereign and neutral and in control of its territory. By the time another American President lifted the restrictions and the U.S. military crossed into Cambodia, Kinnard says, it was already too late." [End of quote] And even more blunt later in his book: "General Kinnard [1st Cav Division Commander] says: 'I was always taught as an officer that in a pursuit situation you continue to pursue until you either kill the enemy or he surrenders. I saw the Ia Drang as a definite pursuit situation and I wanted to keep after them. Not to follow them into Cambodia violated every principle of warfare. I was supported in this by both the military and civilian leaders in Saigon. But the decision was made back there, at the White House, that we would not be permitted to pursue into Cambodia. It became perfectly clear to the North Vietnamese that they then had sanctuary; they could come when they were ready to fight and leave when they were ready to quit.' "General Kinnard adds, 'When General Giap says he learned how to fight Americans and our helicopters at the Ia Drang, that's bullshit! What he learned was that we were not going to be allowed to chase him across a mythical line in the dirt. From that point forward, he was grinning. He can bring us to battle when he wants and where he wants, and where's that? Always within a few miles of the border, where his supply lines were the shortest, where the preponderance of forces is his, where he has scouted the terrain intensely and knows it better than we do.' "William Bundy was then assistant secretary of state. Of that period and that decision, he says, 'I suppose from a strictly military point of view, going into Cambodia would have been a net plus. But there was a good deal more at stake. We were trying to preserve a facade of Cambodia [and Lao] neutrality.' " [End of quote] Thus, in 1965 in what was the first major battle of the Vietnam war using the helicopter for air mobility to insert U.S. forces quickly into a enemy stronghold, our leadership - "to preserve a facade" - set the stage for a stalemate at best..... In closing - in my opinion - the Vietnam war was a noble cause, fought by a vast majority of honorable men, led by less then courageous and honorable politicians and silent Joint Chiefs that was a prescription for failure.... Please also see the appendix for additional articles of interest we collected while conducting our research.
bear317@aol.com The Northwest Veterans Newsletter
"Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but rather place unto wrath:
 Recommended Additional Reading
-- NEW! CCS, MACVSOG "The Beginning" - Related external information of importance! "Air Support Cambodian Invasion" recently posted by a FAC pilot who participated in the '70 Incursion. The 1st Cavalry Division - Vietnam website. Into Cambodia - Keith William Nolan, © 1990, Presidio Press, ISBN 0-89141-673-0.
Footnotes, Side Articles, Appendix, Bibliography I also highly recommend reading "The Secret War Against Hanoi" by Richard H. Shultz, Jr. (HarperCollins - © 1999) to learn more on the restrictions imposed on SOG by the White House, Lao Ambassador Sullivan, our State Dept., and how MACSOG's dangerous cross-border missions into Laos and Cambodia were restricted and compromised! Below I offer hyperlinks to other sites of interest related to this issue. These sites raise serious allegations neither proven or disproven that require further investigation and which have not been investigated by myself. Regards,
bear317@aol.com The Northwest Veterans Newsletter
Other external sites of interest: Bio on Lao CIA Station Chief Ted Shackley - [Note: Shackley has since passed away on 13 Dec 02. ARVN site on Gen. Hieu. Includes information on ARVN Gen. Tri, ARVN 70 & 71 Cambodia incursions, Lt. Gen Davison, and links to A Troop, 3/17th Air Cav articles and awards. Snoul Battle and its Consequences by Tran Van Thuong regarding the '71 Cambodia Incursion which A Troop, 3/17th Air Cav participated in.
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